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The article presents a comparative historical analysis of 
two events from Russian history: the Decembrist Revolt of 
1825 and the Russian uprising of 2011-2012. The analysis 
is aimed at defining features that both events have in 
common. Based on the aftermath of the Decembrist revolt, 
the implications of the Russian uprising of 2011-2012 for 
Russian domestic politics in the long-run are foreseen. The 
study uses a multidisciplinary and holistic approach, 
covering political, socio-cultural, and economic 
perspectives. After a general description of both events the 
comparison takes place, followed by a conclusion.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The October revolution of 1917 is considered the first 
significant revolution in Russian historiography, however 
not many are aware of another particular event that 
challenged Russian society and became a premise for the 
revolution of 1917. Anatole G. Mazour refers to the 
Decembrist revolt as the First Russian Revolution [4]. 
The Decembrist revolt was organized by the Russian army 
officers and their soldiers, the members of the former secret 
society “Union of Welfare” (later known as the Northern and 
Southern Societies), against Emperor Nicolas I in the Peter 
Square in Saint-Petersburg on December, 14th. The secret 
society’s members planned to totally reform the 
governmental system and abolish serfdom. It took long 
eleven years of preparation and organization to make the 
revolt happen. It was cruelly suppressed, and most 
Decembrists were either sentenced to death, or life in 
Siberia. In the aftermath of the revolt, the Emperor’s 
government became more oppressive and imposed control 
on social, cultural and political spheres of life.  
 
The Russian protests of 2011-2012 were the series of rallies 
and uprisings against the fraudulent elections and corruption 
that took place in 2011 and continued into 2012. The main 
demands of the protesters were fair elections, fighting 
corruption, immediate release of all political prisoners, more 
democratic legislation on political parties and elections. At 
the beginning, the government tried to negotiate with the 
protesters, but following the presidential elections of 2012 
the protests started to be suppressed, and many activists were 
arrested and imprisoned. 
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The “Bolotnaya Square” case has still not been closed by 
October 2016. Since 2012, the state of democracy and 
liberalism in Russia has largely deteriorated.  
 
Research question 
Because both events share some common features, it is 
interesting to compare them and not only see the degree to 
which the two events are comparable, but whether there are 
lessons that can be derived from the event that took place 
190 years ago. The central research question of this article 
is to what extent the Decembrist revolt of 1825 is related to 
the uprising in Russia in 2011-2012 and how the Decembrist 




The sub-questions asked throughout the research include the 
similarity of the historical background of both events, 
namely political, economic and socio-cultural problems of 
the epochs. Next, the general flow of events and the actual 
content of the protests, their inspirations, influences, and 
main ideas are compared. Finally, a thorough look at the 
aftermath of the Decembrist revolt and the Russian uprising 
enables us to make predictions about the future scenario in 
Russia. 
 
This comparative analysis is original in the sense that these 
two events have never been compared. It is also 
scientifically relevant because by means of historical 
comparison it becomes possible to make sense of the 
Russian protests of 2011-2012 in terms of its causes, 
chronology and aftermath. It can improve understanding of 
the relationship between the society and the government as 
well as identify common mistakes from both sides. As 
history patterns tend to repeat one way or another, it is 
becoming more influential to search answers to difficult 
questions in history, because history is the only place where 
concepts and theories can be observed in practice. 
 
Since two initial chapters of the original Bachelor thesis 
(The Decembrist revolt: Back in history for the first Russian 
revolution and The Russian protests of 2011-2012: 
background, dynamics, analysis and aftermath) are 
descriptive in nature and merely give a general account of 
the causes, chronology, and results of the two events by a 
careful selection of sources, this article will present only the 
Discussion and Conclusion parts. The role of the two above-
mentioned descriptive chapters is by no means diminished, 
as they served as a basis for the comparative analysis.    
 
DISCUSSION 
After having studied various academic and non-academic 
sources that describe the Decembrist revolt of 1825 and the 
Russian uprising of 2011-2012, a substantial amount of 
common features was found. Only the most used sources 
were included in the References section of this article. 
 
Both events appear to be similar when it comes to Western 
cultural-political influence. In the case of the Decembrists, 
they were inspired by Western thinkers and writers of the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, namely Adam Smith, 
Jeremy Bentham, Benjamin Franklin, Montesquieu and 
Destutt de Tracy [4]. The protest movement in Russia also 
found inspiration from abroad – the gathering “Okkupai 
Abbai” was based on New-York’s “Occupy Wall Street” 
street movement in the 1980s [7].  
Both Alexander I, the Emperor who was in power before the 
Decembrist revolt, and Vladimir Putin, the prime-minister of 
Russia during the protest movement, claimed that Western 
liberal thinking was a threat to Russian sovereignty and 
attributed the reason for protests to the liberal illness from 
the West [6], [3]. Another factor related to the influence from 
abroad is that the Decembrists were ex-soldiers who 
attended the Napoleonic wars, marched through whole 
Europe and familiarized themselves with European 
liberalism [6]. Future modern Russian protesters had 
opportunity to visit Europe and the US in the next decade 
after the collapse of the USSR – when the borders opened 
and the financial situation of average citizens improved [7]. 
Both the future Decembrists and the protesters in the Russian 
uprising saw a connection between liberalism, good 
economy and the level of life of average citizens.   
 
The economic situation is another common feature for both 
events, but it is accountable to mostly all protests. The 
serfdom of the nineteenth century Russia, one of the reasons 
for the Decembrist revolt, was an obstacle to entering the 
industrial era and a condition that substantially slowed the 
Russian economy. Russia also suffered from the 
consequences of the five-month Napoleonic invasion and the 
budget deficit since the rule of Catherine II [4].  The year of 
2011 was perceived by Russian citizens as the year of deep 
economic instability since the financial crisis of 2008. 
People did not have the feeling of life improvement or 
general optimism that is characteristic of any election 
campaigns [7]. 
 
Both for Alexander I’s Russia and Vladimir Putin’s Russia 
it seemed that there was a timeliness for changes. Alexander 
I was perceived as Europe’s liberator from Napoleon and his 
positive image should have been matched with the state of 
affairs at home, while in reality it could not be [6]. Because 
the USSR collapsed and Russia chose a democratic path in 
the 1990s, by 2010 Russia was supposed to continue 
improvement and growth in that direction after having 
fought the disastrous consequences of its transition in 1990s. 
This way, the changes were timely and as both governments 
chose to ignore the signs that the society was actively giving 
them, the protests could not be avoided. 
 
The so-called “interregnum” became a turning point for 
both protests. After the death of Alexander I in November 
1825, Nicolas I, his third brother, inherited the throne under 
vague circumstances. The decision was discussed only in the 
secret letter and private conversations, and was not made 
public until the last moment [4]. In 2011, Dmitry Medvedev 
suggested Vladimir Putin as a candidate from “Yedinaya 
Rossiya” political party for the presidential elections, and 
this action was considered as a transfer of authority which 
was inappropriate for a democracy [8].  
 
Looking at the social background of the protesters from both 
revolts, it can be stated that neither of the movements 
represented “revolutions of the poor”. The Decembrists 
descended from rich aristocratic families and received good 
education [6]. The modern protesters represented the 
Russian middle class, 80 % of people held university 
degrees [7].  Touching upon nationalism and patriotism in 
both protest movements leads to a conclusion that these 
notions stay unchanged for the Russian character, regardless 
the epoch in which the protest occurs. The early Decembrists 
stuck to chauvinistic views, proposing to exile or kill all 
foreigners in the Russian state service. Also, they demanded 
a total russification of the Polish kingdom and the joining of 
all Slavic states into the Russian Empire [4].  
Alexei Navalny, an unofficial protest leader during the 
rallies in 2011-2012, took part in “Russky Marsch”, a mass 
nationalist demonstration, where he openly shouted the 
slogan “Stop feeding the Caucasus”, which referred to a 
problematic Russian region which is inhabited by 
predominantly non-ethnic Russian people of Muslim 
background. Another reference to nationalism in the modern 
protest was Gennady Zyuganov’s (The Russian Communist 
Party leader) suggestion to restore the fifth graph (the graph 
in the Soviet passport, where the nationality was indicated) 
in Russian passports [8]. 
When it comes to patriotism, for both protests it was 
different in quality. After analyzing both events, it can be 
concluded that the Decembrists’ patriotism was formed as a 
set of feelings of a winner-nation after Russia’s victory over 
Napoleon. The Decembrists wanted to make Russia match 
the image it created for Western Europe – to be not only the 
liberator of Europe but of its own people at home. The 
Russian post-Soviet society suffered from the inferiority 
complex after the collapse of the Soviet Union and it was 
not proudly patriotic, but desperately patriotic to make 
Russia great again.  This way, both the Decembrists and the 
protesters were highly-educated, patriotic and politically 
active, and their social background matches as much as it 
can match in regard to a 190 years’ difference.  
 
The ideological-spiritual content of both events became a 
controversial philosophical discussion in the original 
Bachelor thesis. The article by Olga Karbasova [1] was used 
as a counterargument to falsify my own analysis of the 
ideological-spiritual content of the protests. To summarize 
the discussion, she claimed that the Decembrist revolt was 
more spiritual and moral and did not include the economic 
aspect. In reality, it did, as Pavel Pestel, the think-tank and 
main ideologist of the Decembrist movement, wrote that the 
abolition of serfdom was not only necessary from the moral 
account, but would also be beneficial for the economy [4]. 
In Karbasova’s opinion, the rallies of 2011-2012 bore 
substantially political and economic character. The 
conceptual difference in attitudes is that she perceives the 
political motive as a down to earth motive, not deserving the 
moral grounds and appreciation of the protest for the sake of 
the protest. However, demand for respect for the law and 
constitutional rights as well as disgust by corruption are high 
motives in themselves. Gathering and protesting against 
injustice for the common cause and collective good deserves 
the same moral attribute as the Decembrist revolt. Another 
argument Karbasova used in discrediting the modern 
protesters was the procurement of victimhood and 
spirituality by the means of art, that is the participation of 
artists, singers and public figures in the protest. The 
Decembrist revolt was also largely supported by artistic 
figures such as A. Pushkin and A. Griboedov, so it would be 
unfair to blame the modern protest for attracting artists and 
public figures. In the end, there is the ideological-spiritual 
content in both protests, induced by injustice, the sense of 
honor, respect and certain benefits, such as economic ones.  
 
The respect for the law appeared in both revolts. The 
Decembrists could not break the oath to the Emperor, either 
by killing him or by organizing a palace coup. Even in the 
last year before the actual revolt, the Decembrists still 
considered it possible to confess to the Emperor and share 
their economic and political agenda with him. Their loyalty 
to the Emperor and the fact that they took an oath was one 
of the reasons why the revolt failed and, most importantly, 
why no one dared to assassinate the Emperor either before 
the revolt or during the revolt itself, when the Emperor was 
present with his guards in the Peter Square [4]. The modern 
protesters respected the law in the sense that they did not 
engage in a bloody coup d’état, but negotiated with the 
government until the very end. They also respected the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation that granted their 
rights, and demanded the same from the government.  
 
The disapproval of a violent revolution was shared by both 
the Decembrists and the modern protesters. The former 
favored the Spanish scenario of a military revolt which 
would not engage the civilians. As it was mentioned before, 
the modern protesters kept on negotiating with the 
government until it became clear that the government was 
not going to comply with the protesters’ demands. In return, 
the government showed visible disrespect for the protesters 
and never tried to negotiate on the same level with them [7]. 
 
In both protests there were betrayals. P.M. Grivovsky, who 
was a member of the Northern Society, was the Emperor’s 
informer [4]. P.K. Lebedev was an agent of Russian Special 
Forces (FSB), and a member of the Organizational 
Committee of Protesters at the same time [8]. In both cases, 
the governmental structures had been long informed about 
all the steps that the Decembrists and the modern protesters 
took. The scenario by which both revolts developed could 
have been different if the organizations could preserve the 
secret status of both their actions and their members.  
 
As far as the actual protests and their leadership are 
concerned, both the Decembrists and the modern protesters 
shared enthusiasm and readiness to act, but in both cases 
there was a general inconsistency and the lack of overall plan 
of actions. Most importantly, both revolts lacked a 
prominent leader. N. Trubetskoy, a supposed leader of the 
Decembrist revolt, did not even come to the Square on the 
planned day of the revolt [4]. The systematic opposition 
leaders in the modern protests such as G. Zyuganov and M. 
Kasyanov never dared to address the audience from the 
tribunes, probably fearing the failure of the protests and 
avoiding the chance to be persecuted [7].  
 
The absence of a common plan (contradictions between the 
agendas of the Northern and Southern societies in the case 
of the Decembrists and inability to cooperate among the 
members of the Organization and Coordination Committees 
of Protesters in the case of the modern uprising), ideological 
differences (a constitutional monarchy versus a republic in 
the case of the Decembrists), lack of consent among the 
leadership of both protests (N. Muraviev versus P. Pestel in 
the Decembrist movement and the Coordination Committee 
members, the non-systematic opposition and systematic 
opposition in the case of the modern protests) led the revolts 
to failure [4], [8].   
The difference between the Decembrist revolt and the 
modern protests of 2011-2012 that should be mentioned in 
this section is the fact that the leaders of both protests 
differed from each other qualitatively. If N. Muraviev and P. 
Pestel were too modern for their time, M. Kasyanov and G. 
Zyuganov were people with solely Soviet background who 
were outdated and could not be liberal by their nature, even 
though M. Kasyanov claimed to be so. Moreover, if the 
Decembrists who were executed or exiled became martyrs, 
notwithstanding the propaganda of the government, the 
modern Kremlin propaganda completely ruined the 
reputations of many prominent figures that took part in the 
protests. Also, some members of the modern protests were 
not trusted by the audience. Apart from the criminal cases 
that A. Navalny was engaged in, he was too young and 
inexperienced to lead the whole country. K. Sobchak, the 
daughter of Anatoly Sobchak, a popular liberal politician in 
the 1990s in Russia, was not trusted either due to her vague 
reputation (she was usually referred to as Russia’s Paris 
Hilton) and the connections her father had with the Yeltsin’s 
government and most importantly, Vladimir Putin and 
Dmitry Medvedev. The latter worked in his office in the 
1990s [4], [7].  
 
Both revolutions failed. The Decembrist revolt was cruelly 
suppressed with death penalties, exiles in Siberia and forced 
army service in the Caucasus. The criminal case against the 
participants of the Russian uprising in 2011-2012 still goes 
on. The leaders of the protest movement as well as 
prominent participants are denied access to the state-run 
media and are constantly discredited on various controlled 
TV channels and media sources. Sometimes criminal cases 
are initiated on doubtful grounds, not relevant to the 
uprising. The most recent case of the 19th of May 2016 
against A. Navalny involves charges for libel [9]. 
 
 After both revolutions, the control of the state over its 
citizens was tightened, namely by enhancing censorship, 
accepting conservative legislation and erasing everything 
that had to do with the Western harmful influence.  Both 
Nicolas I and Vladimir Putin appealed for nationalism to 
restrict Western influence on Russia and called for rebirth of 
“original” Russian values such as the Russian orthodoxy and 
Russian culture. Neither after the events of 1825 nor after 
the uprising in 2011-2012, did the Western countries 
intervene in the Russian domestic politics. In the aftermath 
of the Decembrist revolt, right until the fall of czarism in 
Russia, the nineteenth century was known as a century of 
struggle between czarism and the radical terror-oriented 
organizations. One of them succeeded by assassinating 
Alexander II, the only liberal Emperor who abolished 
serfdom in 1861 [3], [6]. No liberal emperor would be liberal 
enough for the outrageous society. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The comparative analysis of the Decembrist revolt of 1825 
and the Russian uprising of 2011-2012 showed that two 
events not only can be compared but also have common 
features. Both revolts had a similar background, problems 
and outcomes. The main idea behind both revolts was to 
make Russia move forward and match the image of a modern 
European country it tried to create and simply make all 
people stand equal by the law.  
Returning to the initial question that concerned the future 
scenario of the Russian domestic politics, the Decembrist 
revolt’s case showed that following the years of oppression 
from the government’s side, radical organizations started to 
evolve, ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the 
common cause and change of the regime in the country. If 
the Decembrists lacked the consent, plan, and essentially 
confidence, the future radical terror organizations had 
abundance of it [6]. 
 
Despite the calm period in Russia, visible absence of any 
civil activism and high appreciation ratings of Vladimir 
Putin (April 2016, 82 %), a disastrous state of affairs in the 
country regarding the recent financial crisis caused by the 
sanctions, political freedoms and conservative attitude 
towards any socio-cultural activities substantially lowered 
the society’s support of the current government (April 2016, 
49 %) [2]. The president and the government are things that 
are perceived as separate entities in the Russian mind. 
Because the government consists mostly of the supporters of 
Vladimir Putin, as long as the latter stays in power, the 
current government will stay, and vice versa.  
The protest potential in Russia nowadays is very low. 
According to the most recent polls, 74 % of people indicated 
that it was not likely that the new protest movement was to 
occur; 82 % of people said that they were not going to take 
part in any protest movements. Moreover, only 13 % of the 
society thinks that the Western type of democracy can be 
applied to Russian national character. Only 52 % of people 
indicated that the opposition as such should exist, and around 
half does not trust the opposition leaders [2].  
 
The general tendency derived from the comparative analysis 
is that there will be oppression of all spheres of life and 
prevalence of conservatism, which has already taken place 
in Russia. The more conservative and oppressive the state is, 
the more violent and uncontrollable the society will become. 
How much time it will take until the society turns into chaos 
is unknown – it may be five, ten or even seventy years, but 
it will be impossible to avoid the civil unrest. Vladimir Putin 
and the government are aware of this scenario, but they act 
on a short-term basis and do not seem interested in the future 
of the country, as both they and their families are guaranteed 
a comfortable life in case of any scenario. The fact that 
conservatism and authoritarianism always worked for a long 
time until the next collapse (1825-1917-1991-2011-?), 
makes the current political leaders less inclined to reform the 
country. Rather, intimidated legislation is accepted and 
restrictive measures are taken. As long as the president’s 
rating is above the 50 %, the system has nothing to fear.  
 
Taking into account the fact that this research had 
limitations, such as the difference in time periods and the 
political system, it is necessary to continue deeper research 
as this work could not cover many interesting topics in 
detail. For example, it would be important to study the 
perception of liberalism then and now, public reaction to the 
revolts in their aftermath, the leadership problems of the 
protesters and the methods deployed by the governments in 
stiffening the legislation.  
In conclusion, it should be said that the Decembrist revolt is 
an event that repeated itself in one form or another 
throughout the history of the modern Russian state. That is 
why knowledge, understanding and attention to history are 
so crucial – they would help both the political system and 
the potential protesters not to make the same mistakes and, 
possibly, avoid confrontation as such in the first place. 
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